

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**TRANSITION FROM PEACEKEEPING TO
PEACEBUILDING: TRAINING/ EDUCATION
IMPLICATIONS**

by

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December 2000

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TRAINING/ EDUCATION IMPLICATIONS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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


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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the current peace operations training and education process is inadequate because it fails to incorporate peacebuilding, defined as: providing a secure environment that allows economic, political, humanitarian, and social development, which are the conditions necessary for the establishment of a self-sustaining, lasting peace. Absent the training for and conduct of peacebuilding operations (PBO), the military cannot withdraw from an area of operations because the conditions necessary for self-sustaining, lasting peace will not have been established, only conditions that prevent the re-emergence of violence. PBO take place during the period in which the former warring factions and society institutionalize or consolidate peace. Although force may be necessary at times to control violence, the military must rely on other methods and skills in order to continue the peace process towards the eventual objective of a self-sustaining, lasting peace. Leaders and soldiers must be educated and trained in these other methods, and provided the tools to determine when to employ these methods and when to use force to achieve missions objectives. This thesis will examine the missions the military may be asked to perform, and the kinds of training and education necessary to prepare the military for these missions.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND/ OR SYMBOLS

ACR -	Armored Cavalry Regiment
AD -	Armored Division
AOR -	Area of Responsibility
BCTP -	Battle Command Training Program
CPT -	Captain
CMIS -	Civilian-Military Implementation Staff
CMOC -	Civil-Military Operations Center
CSM -	Command Sergeant Major
DoD -	Department of Defense
DPRES -	Displaced Persons and Refugees
FM -	Field Manual
FWF -	Former Warring Factions
G-3 -	Operations Officer
G-5 -	Civil-Military Officer
GFAP -	General Framework Agreement for Peace
IFOR -	Implementation Force
IC -	International Community
IO -	International Organizations
IPTF -	International Police Task Force
Joint Pub -	Joint Publication
JRTC -	Joint Readiness Training Center
JV2020 -	Joint Vision 2020
LTC -	Lieutenant Colonel
MAJ -	Major
METL -	Mission Essential Task List
METT-TC -	Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops Available, Time, Courses of Action
MND (N) -	Multinational Division - North
MRE -	Mission Rehearsal Exercise
MSCA -	Military Support to Civilian Authorities
MOOTW -	Military Operations Other than War
MOS -	Military Occupation Specialty
NATO -	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO -	Noncommissioned Officer
NGO -	Nongovernmental Organization
NSS -	National Security Strategy
OCOKA -	Obstacles, Cover and Concealment, Observation and Fields of Fire, Key Terrain, Avenues of Approach
OHR -	Office of the High Representative
OSCE -	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OPFOR -	Opposing Forces
OPTEMPO -	Operational Tempo
PB -	Peacebuilding
PBO -	Peacebuilding Operations

PDD -	Presidential Decision Directive
PEO -	Peace Enforcement Operations
PK -	Peacekeeping
PKO -	Peacekeeping Operations
PO -	Peace Operations
R & S -	Reconnaissance and Security
SFOR -	Stabilization Force
SKA -	Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities
SPORTS -	Slap the magazine, Pull the charging handle to the rear, Observe the chamber, Release the charging handle, Tap the bolt forward assist, Squeeze the trigger
STX -	Situational Training Exercise
TCN -	Troop Contribution Nations
TST -	Tactical Support Teams
TPP -	Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures
US -	United States
1SG -	First Sergeant
2LT -	Second Lieutenant

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis argues that the current peace operations training and education process is inadequate because it fails to incorporate peacebuilding, defined as: providing a secure environment that allows economic, political, humanitarian, and social development, which are the conditions necessary for the establishment of a self-sustaining, lasting peace. Absent the training for and conduct of peacebuilding operations (PBO), the military cannot withdraw from an area of operations because the conditions necessary for a self-sustaining, lasting peace will not have been established, only conditions that prevent the re-emergence of violence. PBO take place during the period in which the former warring factions and society institutionalize or consolidate peace. Although force may be necessary at times to control violence, the military must rely on other methods and skills in order to continue the peace process towards the eventual objective of a self-sustaining, lasting peace. Leaders and soldiers must be educated and trained in these other methods and provided the tools to determine when to employ these methods and when to use force to achieve missions objectives. This thesis will examine the missions the military may be asked to perform, and the kinds of training and education necessary to prepare the military for these missions. I will recommend methods of training and education that will prepare soldiers and leaders to accomplish peacebuilding missions and to be effective partners with local authorities and civilian agencies responsible for promoting stability and building a self-sustaining, lasting peace. Such conditions, in turn, will permit the safe and timely withdrawal of US and other military forces. My recommendations are summarized as follows:

1. Soldiers and leaders need front loaded training in the following areas:

- Political, cultural, and historical factors influencing the stability-building mission;
- Roles, responsibilities, and strategies of indigenous institutions, US government agencies and organizations, international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for executing the stability-building mission;
- Negotiation, conflict resolution, and communications skills needed to promote stability;
- Techniques in problem solving with influence and how to “think about the Area of Responsibility;”
- Lessons learned through the successes and failures of previous units, NGOs, and IOs trying to promote stability;

2. Development and execution of Situational Training Exercises (STX), Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE), Staff Exercises, and Decision Making Exercises to operate along the full spectrum of possible responses;

3. Development and execution of STX, MRE, Staff Exercises, and Decision Making Exercises to employ operational knowledge and training at the appropriate level of decision-making consistent with performance of tasks.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Current peace operations preparation is flawed because it fails to address peacebuilding operations (PBO). PBO take place during the period in which the former warring factions and society institutionalize or consolidate peace. Although force may be necessary at times to control violence, the military must rely on other methods and skills in order to continue the peace process towards the goal of a self-sustaining, lasting peace. This thesis will examine the kinds of missions the military may be called upon to perform and the training required to prepare the military for these missions in order to advance the peace process.

Recent controversies over the role and actions of peacekeepers, from Canadians in Somalia to US troops in Kosovo, raise the question of what training is necessary for peace operations (PO), specifically late stage peacekeeping and early peacebuilding operations. FM 25-101, "Battle Focused Training," states:

Training is the Army's top priority; it prepares us to fight. As leaders, our sacred responsibility is to ensure that no soldier ever dies in combat because that soldier was not properly trained. Training is the cornerstone of readiness and the basis for credible deterrence and capable defense. Training is the means by which the Army's quality soldiers and leaders develop their warfighting proficiency and exercise the collective capabilities they will require in combat. Training prepares soldiers, leaders, and units to fight and win in war--the Army's basic mission.¹

Although FM 25-101 was written to prepare for a Cold War threat, it is the current doctrine for the planning and execution of training and is very much applicable

¹ "Battle Focused Training," Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-101, In the *General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library*. 30 September 1990. Available [Online]: <http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/25-101/fm251_1.htm#REF1h2> [18 Sep 00]

for PO training. Training remains the foundation of readiness. Based on the National Security Strategy, however, training must be not only the means by which the Army's soldiers and leaders develop their warfighting proficiency and exercise the collective capabilities they will require in combat. Training also must be the means by which these same soldiers and leaders develop their "other than warfighting" proficiency and exercise the collective capabilities they will require in military operations other than war (MOOTW). MOOTW missions require that all leaders in the Army understand, attain, sustain, and enforce high standards of combat readiness and mission specific readiness through tough, realistic, multi-echelon, combined arms training designed to challenge and develop individuals, leaders, and units. Identification of the skills, knowledge, and abilities (SKAs) necessary for performance of late stage peacekeeping operations (PKO) and PBO is an invaluable resource for the development of the commander's training plan prior to deployment for POs.

Unfortunately, these SKAs are not being identified for all soldiers and units preparing for PKO and PBO. As a psychological operations noncommissioned officer told Dr. S. E. Archer, "NCOs and junior officers are the ones on the ground the most and are also the ones who deal with the public/ civilian community. They must have much more training that is realistic of what they will find on the ground."² CPT Kendric Robbins, a troop commander with 3rd BN 3rd ACR, echoed this deficiency, "We need to spend more time in training on negotiation skills and other non-force methods of solving problems because there is not as much conflict as was presented in the Mission Rehearsal

² Archer, S.E. Dr., "Bosnia Report March-April 2000," *Feedback Interviews from 49th ID at Camp Eagle, Tuzla 1-3 April 2000*, unpublished internal report.

Exercise (MRE) and Situational Training Exercises (STX). You can get more accomplished through these methods than with force and if you don't provide the training to junior leaders the only way they are going to be exposed to these skills is from the gunner's seat or the tank commander's seat.”³

During the process of researching and writing this thesis, I conducted interviews with soldiers and leaders preparing for and conducting peace operations in Bosnia, in an attempt to gain the “ground truth” of what training is needed to successfully complete the mission. Others have conducted even more extensive interviews on the subject. The consensus of all this research is that if the Army and other military forces are to establish regional stability in a given mission, we need to change our training and education methods to provide our soldiers and leaders with the knowledge that will allow them to apply existing military decision-making tools to establish a self-sustaining, lasting peace. A stable peace then will allow for the safe and timely exit or withdrawal of the Army and other military forces from the area.

Because we are not providing this foundation of skills, transitioning from the prevention of further violence to the exit of military forces remains problematic in PO. The longer it takes to establish peace, the longer US and other military forces will be required to conduct PO in Bosnia, or other countries. Proper education and training can prepare the military to act as an effective partner with local authorities and civilian agencies, to make sure the Bosnian or other government will be able to operate without a United Nations presence.

³ Robbins, Kendric CPT, Troop K Commander 3/3 ACR., Personal interview, Camp Dobol, Bosnia, 6 September 2000.

The progress of military operations in Bosnia is measured in accordance with the June 1998 Op Plan, providing an idea of the overall progress towards mission accomplishment. General Wesley Clark, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stated during his Situational Report on Bosnia on 9 December 1999, “[W]hat we know is that most of the military tasks have been done, but not sustained. The civil implementation tasks have not been completed. We can't, in the military, do the civil implementation tasks, but the civil implementation tasks can't be done without the kind of secure environment that the military provides.”⁴ This statement illustrates that there is a divergence between the military implementation tasks and the civil implementation tasks necessary for promoting stability and ensuring a stable peace. This disparity can be traced to the training management cycle and the focus on training for tasks that prevent the re-emergence of violence, but do not foster a partnership with those authorities and agencies responsible for the civil implementation tasks. This results in two parallel efforts, military and civil implementation, without a bridge linking the two. Increased and refocused education and training can provide this link.

This thesis first will argue that PBO build on PKO, along a continuum of peace operations. The definition provided by Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, states that peacebuilding consists of post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, which strengthen and rebuild government

⁴ “DoD News Briefing,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 9 December 1999, Presenter General Wesley Clark, CINCEUR and SACEUR.” In the *Defense LINK Web Site*. 9 December 1999. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/t12091999_t-209clar.html> [19 May 00]

infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.⁵ This definition is inadequate, however, because the purpose of peacebuilding is to provide a secure environment that allows economic, political, humanitarian, and social development. Peacebuilding requires a longer and more robust presence than most peace operations. The process of peacebuilding provides the transition from the consent of the former warring factions to the terms of an agreement or accord, to the institutionalization of the peace process. The main objective in the peacebuilding process is to remove violence as an instrument for conflict resolution and to establish a self-sustaining, lasting peace.

The second argument of this thesis contends that because peacebuilding operations occur in an environment that is event driven rather than conflict driven, the missions that the military will perform during peacebuilding operations will vary based upon the situation and the time period in which they occur. This thesis further argues that because the desired end-state of PBO is a sustained peace, the mission focus cannot solely be on establishing a secure environment and preventing the re-emergence of violence. In addition, the missions also must focus on creating partnerships with the authorities and civilian agencies responsible for stability and achieving the desired end-state.

The third argument of this thesis is that we must provide better education and training to our soldiers and leaders prior to the conduct of these missions. The Army currently is providing excellent training to soldiers and leaders to conduct specific tasks and react to particular situations in order to suppress or prevent the re-emergence of

⁵ "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, as amended through 24 January 2000. In the *Joint Electronic Library Web Site*. 24 January 2000. Available [Online] <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf>, [19 Jun 00].

violence and armed conflict. This training is not enough, however, to prepare soldiers and leaders for the tasks of establishing a stable peace and performing as an effective partner with the authorities and civilian agencies responsible for promoting stability. PBO occur in a complex and ambiguous environment. Training and education must provide soldiers and leaders with the skills and knowledge to use their judgment confidently when they respond to situations for which there are not clear-cut solutions. Current preparation for PO is not providing this foundation. SSG Robin Bolmer illustrated this sentiment, “Our training was too extreme in terms of intensity level. It set up a pace of action that we did not see in country. As a result, coming out of the MRE and STX, we developed a simple solution to every situation we encountered – “Zip Strip.”⁶ To discover the “ground truth” in preparing this thesis, I conducted interviews with soldiers and leaders in the 49th Armor Division (AD), 3rd Battalion, 3rd ACR; 29th Infantry Division; 1st Cavalry Division; members of the Civil Affairs community; personnel at the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, National Guard Bureau, and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP); and foreign officers involved in peace operations. I have reviewed After Action Reviews from previous Stabilization Force (SFOR) rotations and Center for Lessons Learned documents on the subject. I have reviewed and studied Joint Doctrine, Army Doctrine, and theoretical and empirical works on peace operations and conflict resolution. These primary and secondary sources have provided the foundation for my three arguments.

The following four chapters will cover:

⁶ Zip Strip refers to the process of placing any belligerent person in flex hand cuffs, searching the person, and separating that person from the crowd. Bolmer, Robin SSG and Miller, Bryan SSG, Tank Company 3rd BN 3rd ACR. Personal Interview, 6 September 2000, Camp Dobol, Bosnia.

Chapter II: Peace Operations

This chapter will review Joint Doctrine for Peace Operations, and examine both peace operations and operations in support of diplomatic efforts. It will provide an expanded and detailed definition of peacebuilding, necessary for mission analysis. It will present the argument that peace operations occur along a continuum that is based on evolution of events rather than conflict escalation.

Chapter III: Peacebuilding Tasks

This chapter will review military and civilian implementation tasks. It will outline the missions the military should perform to create an effective partnership with local authorities and civilian agencies to achieve a self-sustaining, lasting peace. It will look at the missions the military can perform to maintain a secure environment and create local coalitions in support of the peace process.

Chapter IV: Peacebuilding Training

This chapter will provide a brief overview of Army training doctrine. It will consider issues important for developing a training plan that will provide soldiers and leaders with the knowledge and skills to be able to exercise their judgment in complex and ambiguous environments. It will describe mission-enabling tasks that will facilitate the accomplishment of most, if not all, peacebuilding tasks.

Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter will bring together the findings developed from the previous three chapters. I will offer recommendations and solutions for the problems identified in my findings. These recommendations are summarized as follows: Soldiers and leaders need front-loaded training in the following areas:

- Political, cultural and historical factors influencing the stability mission;
- Roles, responsibilities, and strategies of indigenous institutions, US government agencies and organizations, international organizations, and NGOs for executing the stability mission;
- Negotiation, conflict resolution, and communications skills required to promote stability;
- Techniques in problem solving with influence and how to “think about the Area of Responsibility;”
- Lessons learned from previous successes and failures by units, NGOs, and IOs;
- Development and execution of STX, MRE, Staff Exercises, and Decision Making Exercises that operate along the full spectrum of possible responses within the theater;
- Development and execution of STX, MRE, Staff Exercises, and Decision Making Exercises that employ operational knowledge and training at the appropriate level of decision-making consistent with performance of tasks.

II. PEACE OPERATIONS

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), introduced the term “peacebuilding” in 1992 in *An Agenda for Peace*.⁷ He conceived of peacebuilding as a way to continue UN efforts to promote peace, and as the next instrument in the organization’s existing peace operations: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Since its introduction, the concept of peacebuilding has gained increased acceptance in academic, political, and military circles. Its precise definition and method of implementation, however, vary among the various communities. This failure to reach a consensus on the definition and conceptualization of peacebuilding is ironic, considering that the goal of peacebuilding is to achieve consensus within societies so that the process to establish an institutionalized peace can begin. Peacebuilding is not separate from peace operations, but rather a continuation of the process.

Peacebuilding is not an altogether new concept, but rather an evolution of a US policy, “nation building” that emerged with the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II, and was used most recently in Panama in 1989. When the Allies occupied Germany and Japan, nation building was a predominantly military-led promotion of democratization, demilitarization, and economic reform. During the Cold War, nation building involved similar processes intended to provide legitimacy to the

⁷ “An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping,” Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, GA and SC, A/47/277, S/2411, In the *United Nations Web Site – Secretary-General Documents*. 17 June 1992. Available [Online]: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>> [5 Jun 00].

concept of democracy in an attempt to challenge communist advances. Only since the end of the Cold War has the concept evolved to mean the enhancement of international security and stability.⁸

The lessons learned from post-Cold War nation building operations in Somalia and Haiti have provided the foundation for the peacebuilding initiative. The main difference between nation building and peacebuilding is that peacebuilding is not primarily a military-led operation, but rather a partnership with leaders and institutions to establish stability and a stable peace. There are two distinct levels of peacebuilding, external and internal, but both levels must be unified in their efforts in order to be successful. External peacebuilding establishes the structures and institutions within the former conflict area to establish the conditions necessary for stability. Internal peacebuilding is the long-term process, maintained primarily by indigenous actors, to establish local coalitions of peace dedicated to promoting political and economic development, and a sustainable solution to the causes of the conflict. The fostering of indigenous peacebuilders willing to assist in the reconstruction of a war torn country is essential to the success of the operation.

Just as there are different levels within peacebuilding, there also are multiple organizations and agencies involved in the peacebuilding process, which is the next step up from nation building. IOs, regional organizations (ROs), NGOs, military personnel, and indigenous leaders all have different roles in the peacebuilding process. Based on the capabilities and expertise of a particular organization, it may take a primary or supporting

⁸ The basis for this can be found in the democratic peace theory which, simply stated, hypothesizes that democracies do not go to war with other democracies.

role in some portion of the peacebuilding task.

In order to comprehend the definition and process of peacebuilding, it is necessary to understand the full spectrum of peace operations, as currently provided in DoD doctrine. Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, states that for US Armed Forces, PO encompass PKO and peace enforcement operations (PEO).⁹ It further states that all US military PO must support strategic and policy objectives and their implementing diplomatic activities. In addition to PO (PKO and PEO), the military may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict.¹⁰ Joint Publication 3-07.3 lists the missions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacebuilding as operations in support of diplomatic efforts. This creates the illusion that peace operations and operations in support of diplomacy are two distinct and separate operations. DoD doctrine is based on an escalation principle, with operations in support of diplomatic efforts occurring during periods of lower conflict and peace operations occurring in periods of higher conflict (see Figure 1). Before presenting an alternative explanation of peace operations, it is important to understand how joint doctrine defines each level of peace operations.

⁹ "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations," Department of Defense Joint Publications 3-07.3, , In the *Joint Electronic Library Web Site*. 12 February 1999. Available [Online]: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_3.pdf> [19 Jun 00].

¹⁰ Ibid.

Peace Operations Continuum




Figure 1 – Peace Operations Continuum (Escalation Model) as presented in Joint Pub 3.07

A. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

Preventative diplomacy consists of diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence.¹¹ Preventative diplomacy requires measures to create confidence among all the participants in order to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Preventative actions can be taken only based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the facts. Because of the economic, social, and cultural causes behind many of today's conflicts, information needed for preventative diplomacy must be based on a through understanding of developments and regional trends. It may rely on informal and formal fact-finding missions to the country in question. As a final action to avoid armed

conflict, preventative diplomacy may involve preventative deployment and, in some situations, the establishment of demilitarized zones. Preventative deployment is the deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tensions are rising among parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peacekeeping force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities.¹² The objective of preventive diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in armed conflict, or, if armed conflict breaks out, to act quickly to contain and resolve the underlying causes for the conflict.

B. PEACEMAKING

Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to dispute, and resolves the issues that lead to conflict.¹³ Peacemaking relies primarily on the persuasive power of the United Nations or regional organizations to lead hostile parties towards negotiations. Military involvement in peacemaking operations, although limited, may consist of military support to diplomatic efforts, military-to-military relations, security assistance, or other activities to influence the disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.¹⁴ The objective of peacemaking is the arrangement of a settlement that puts an end to the dispute and resolves the issues that led to the conflict.

C. PEACE ENFORCEMENT

PE is the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant

¹¹ “Department of Defense Dictionary.”

¹² “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.”

¹³ “Department of Defense Dictionary.”

¹⁴ “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.”

to international authorization, to compel compliance with the resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.¹⁵ Force is threatened against or applied to belligerent parties in order to stop the fighting, restore order and create an environment conducive to resolving the conflict. PEO do not attempt to resolve the underlying problems that caused peaceful relations to dissolve; they do, however, begin to create the conditions in which peaceful resolution of the conflict may proceed. The environment surrounding PEO is one of continued conflict, which is being perpetrated by at least one if not all the belligerent parties. Finally, in PEO, consent of the parties involved in the conflict is not required, although some parties may extend their consent. The objective of PEO is to enforce the conditions of a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order.¹⁶

D. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parities to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.¹⁷ Prior to the initiation of PKO, an agreement must be in effect, and all the parties to the conflict must consent to the operation. PKO only take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement amongst all the belligerent parties, the sponsoring organization, and the potential troop contributing nations (TCN). The primary function of peacekeepers is to maintain a highly visible presence, which inhibits hostile action by the disputing parities and bolsters confidence in the peace process. PKO

¹⁵ “Department of Defense Dictionary.”

¹⁶ “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.”

support continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve long-term political settlements and normalized peaceful relations. The objective of these operations is to fulfill a mandate, in many cases to reduce or eliminate violence, facilitate the implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.¹⁸

E. PEACEBUILDING

Joint Publication 1-02, “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” states that peacebuilding is post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, which strengthen and rebuild government infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.¹⁹ This definition provides an inadequate depiction of the purpose of peacebuilding because it concentrates on preventing a relapse into conflict instead of on promoting a sustained and lasting peace. The definition of peacebuilding should focus more on providing a secure environment that allows economic, political, humanitarian, and social development, the conditions necessary for the establishment of a self-sustaining, lasting peace. Peacebuilding requires a longer and more robust presence than most peace operations. The process of peacebuilding provides the transition from the consent of the former warring factions to terms of the agreement to the institutionalization of the peace process. The main objective in the peacebuilding process is to remove violence as an instrument for conflict resolution and the establishment of a stable peace.

For the peacebuilding process to be successful, it must include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures that will tend to consolidate peace and advance a

¹⁷ “Department of Defense Dictionary.”

¹⁸ “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.”

sense of confidence and well being among people. Peacebuilding programs must focus on maintaining a secure environment, rebuilding and improving political and rule of law institutions, economic and infrastructure institutions, and reconciliation and civil society institutions. Military support of peacebuilding activities improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to the peacebuilding process. To be successful, however, two conditions are necessary for the use of military support: Consent of the governed to have security forces in place and democratic control over the instruments of violence.

Just as PO occur over a continuum of events, so do peacebuilding activities. PBO follow a structure of events, building upon the success of the previous action in order to meet the desired end-state. The peacebuilding continuum moves from the maintenance of a secure environment to the development of institutional structures accepted by society, proceeds to the transfer of the operations of these institutions to the former warring factions, and culminates in the eventual withdrawal of external peacebuilding forces. PBO are both offensive and defensive in their nature. Offensive actions are taken to meet the goal of building a civil society and democratic culture, while defensive actions are taken to avoid relapses and remove the isolation and demoralization that tend to arise during conflict. This thesis offers an expanded definition of peacebuilding by breaking down the definition into its four basic elements: Maintaining a secure environment; rebuilding and reconstruction of both governmental and economic institutions; and reconciliation and reconstruction of civil institutions. This expanded definition provides a greater understanding of peacebuilding's desired end-state.

¹⁹ "Department of Defense Dictionary."

1. Maintaining a Secure Environment

The initial task along the continuum of peacebuilding is the maintenance of a secure environment. During PKO, peacekeepers are often tasked to observe, monitor, verify, and report any alleged violations of governing agreements; supervise disengagement and withdrawal; supervise demobilization and demilitarization; and assist in the maintenance of public order. Although some of these tasks will continue during peacebuilding, the goal of creating a secure environment is to restore the trust between the former warring factions. Through the development of trust and confidence in the peace process, former warring factions are afforded individual and collective security. This facilitates the return of refugees and displaced persons and the reintegration of these people into society. The process of maintaining a secure environment builds the institutional structures for both the reconciliation and rebuilding of governmental and civil institutions. The conditions that evolve from this process include some of the minimal conditions necessary for political development to proceed: All citizens have a right to express themselves on political matters without the danger of punishment; citizens have the right to form relatively independent associations and organizations; and citizens have the right to seek out alternative sources of information.

2. Governmental Institutions

Following the establishment of trust and confidence in the process and the removal of the fear of individual and collective insecurity, the rebuilding and reconstruction of governmental institutions and the rule of law may continue. Peacekeepers often are tasked to assist in the maintenance of public order and to support civil authorities through supervision of elections, transfer of authority, or temporary

administration of civil functions. The peacebuilding process builds upon these actions and develops confidence in governmental institutions. The process of holding free and fair elections is not sufficient to establish a functioning government. Structure needs to be provided to allow popularly elected officials to be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subject to overriding opposition from un-elected individuals or groups (whether informally or formally). Peacebuilding also requires the reestablishment of the rule of law. Civil police and officers of the court require retraining and guidance in the administration of justice in order for the judicial system to be reestablished. The administration of political and judicial functions, furthermore, must be transferred fully to the former warring factions in order for peacebuilding operations to be successful.

Citizens must be provided access to and allowed to participate in the governmental systems. This will help prevent the re-emergence of violence because citizens thus are given a mechanism other than violence to resolve their disputes. In addition, peacebuilding incorporates the reestablishment of health care and educational institutions. Local officials may require guidance and assistance to ensure the economical and effective operations of these structures. In order to facilitate the institutionalization of a peaceful society, it is essential that these autonomous governmental institutions be established so that their operations can be transferred to the former warring factions.

3. Economic Institutions²⁰

Concurrent with the rebuilding and reconstruction of governmental institutions, the rebuilding and reconstruction of economic institutions may proceed. During PKO, limited attention is paid to economic reconstruction, other than the use of humanitarian and foreign aid. There is a direct link, however, between peacekeeping activities and peacebuilding activities. De-mining is an important operation of PKO and it becomes critical to economic reform during peacebuilding. Reestablishment of agricultural industries and the restoration of the transportation infrastructure cannot be accomplished without continued de-mining operations. Peacebuilding involves the restoration and redevelopment of infrastructure. The reestablishment of transportation and utilities, such as water, electricity, and sewer systems, builds confidence in governmental institutions and further encourages belief in the peace process. Peacebuilding includes the development of economic and financial institutions. A stable economy and the implementation of market reforms (if necessary) are indispensable to the success of the peacebuilding process. The process may begin at the grass roots level, with assistance to small businesses and micro-enterprises. Improvement and assistance within the small business sector promote the expansion of economic success. Small businesses create employment, which provides income for both consumption and investment. Additionally,

²⁰ Although governmental and economic rebuilding and restructuring are essential measures for a self-sustaining, lasting peace and may occur simultaneously, they are presented in this order in accordance with Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's analysis of democratic transitions and consolidations. Linz and Stepan argue that the establishment of governmental structures should precede economic initiatives during the consolidation phase of democracy as the optimum sequence strategy. This allows for the understanding of decisions-rules, the creation of institutional arrangements, the removal of barriers to participation, and the creation of political society. Socioeconomic policies are produced by and flow out of this setting. Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 434-457.

employment growth allows for the collection of taxes, which can be used to further improve public infrastructure and help rebuild society as a whole. In order to facilitate the institutionalization of a peaceful society, it is essential to build the economic structures that restore confidence and trust in civil society. Peacebuilding develops these institutions and builds confidence in their operations, so that eventually their oversight may be transferred to the former warring parties.

4. Reconciliation and Civil Institutions

The task of reconciling and reconstructing a civil society's institutions is the most difficult task facing peacebuilders. It begins during PKO and continues throughout the peacebuilding process. Reconciliation is a process of institutionalization. The former warring factions must have confidence in the peace in order to prevent the reemergence of conflict. The process of reconciling and restoring civil society includes conflict resolution and confidence building measures. It is comprised of community-based initiatives designed to instill confidence, acceptance, and trust between the former warring parties. The primary mechanism for this is the reintegration of refugees, displaced persons, and combatants into the community, and promotion of tolerance and acceptance of these groups. This rehabilitation occurs throughout the entire peace process, during the establishment of a secure environment, as well as during governmental and economic reconstruction. The process of building societal confidence and trust is the rope that ties all other peacebuilding activities together and provides the incentive to transfer the operation of the other peacebuilding tasks to the former warring factions.

F. PEACE OPERATIONS CONTINUUM

Peace operations should be viewed as a continuum of events, in which preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are steps along the way to the desired end-state, a lasting peace. The first stage – preventive diplomacy and peacemaking – seeks to resolve conflict before the parties resort to violence. The second stage – peace enforcement, and early peacekeeping – are required to halt conflicts and return order to society. The third stage – peacekeeping and early peacebuilding – seeks to preserve peace once it is attained and instill the willingness to resolve differences without resorting to violence. The final stage – peacebuilding – is the period during which a unified response designed to rebuild civil society and “support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict,” can be pursued (see Figure 2).²¹

George Joulwan and Christopher Shoemaker describe three phases of a conflict suppression operations: Transformation, stabilization, and normalization. Transformation is the period during which the belligerents are separated, weapons are controlled, and demilitarization lines are established. The principle focus of this phase is to keep the former warring factions separated, so efforts are devoted primarily to military peacekeeping. Stabilization is the period during which military requirements gradually diminish as a cease-fire or agreement becomes institutionalized. Implementation of civilian aspects of the peace accord or agreement now begin to assume a more prominent role as the foundations for an enduring peace are established, institutions are built, and policies and procedures are developed. Normalization is the period during which the

²¹ “An Agenda for Peace.”

implementation of both military and civilian aspects of the peace accord are complete, an external military presence no longer is needed, international civilian agencies and institutions have completed their work, and responsibilities for governmental and security functions are assumed by the country's government itself.²²




Figure 2 – Peace Operations Continuum (Event model)²³

Regardless of the number of phases or the names of the phases, it is important to view peace operations as an evolution of events occurring along a continuum. Even the attempt to link peace operations with the stages or phases of the conflict does a disservice

²² Joulwan, George A. and Shoemaker, Christopher C. "Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond." In the *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Web Site*. December 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://ccpdc.org/pubs/joul/joul.htm>> [26 Sep 00].

²³ Eyre, Dana P. Personal Interview, 14 Jun 00, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.

to the argument, because the events in the resolution of a conflict and the creation of stability are fluid and dynamic. The distinct tasks performed in each operation, however, most closely match the phases of resolution of the conflict and creation of a self-sufficient, lasting peace.

The analogy of a bar fight is helpful to visualize this concept. Two individuals have a dispute in a local pub. The first stage, preventative diplomacy and peacemaking, occurs when friends or outsiders attempt to resolve the situation by talking to the two potential combatants prior to the outbreak of violence. They use various methods and means to persuade the two not to engage in fighting to resolve their dispute. If the friends are unsuccessful and the dispute erupts into a fight, the conflict proceeds to the second stage – peace enforcement. Peace enforcement is equivalent to the bouncers stepping in and separating the two combatants. This stage will continue as the bouncers and friends will calm the two combatants down, keep them separated and attempt to reach an agreement to end the dispute. This then leads into the third phase, peacekeeping, as the bouncers and friends will attempt to build consent between the two combatants. Friends will tell the two combatants to “cool out,” bouncers keep an increased presence in the area of the dispute and enforce the provisions of the agreement used to resolve the dispute, and the pub attempts to return to normalcy. The final stage, peacebuilding, occurs as the patrons of the bar return to their normal activities. When a potential conflict re-erupts between the two original combatants or others, the patrons inform the participants that fighting does not have any place in this pub, that people are in the pub to

have a good time and enjoy themselves, and that the disputants must resolve their dispute by other means.²⁴

G. SUMMARY

Peace operations and operations in support of diplomatic efforts are not separate and distinct operations, but rather operations that occur along a continuum of events that are time-phase driven, rather than level-of-conflict driven. PBO are a continuation of PKO along the continuum of peace operations. The definition provided by Joint Publication 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, states that peacebuilding is post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild government infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.²⁵ This definition is inadequate because it concentrates on preventing conflict rather than on promoting a stable peace. The definition of peacebuilding should focus on providing a secure environment that allows economic, political, humanitarian, and social development, the conditions necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace. Peacebuilding requires a longer and more robust military presence than most peace operations. The process of peacebuilding provides the transition from the consent by former warring factions to terms of a peace agreement or accord to the institutionalization of the peace process. The main objective in the peacebuilding process is to remove violence as an instrument for conflict resolution and to establish a self-sustaining, lasting peace. PBO are a necessary element of the peace operations continuum because they allow the exit of US and other military forces without the re-emergence of violence.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ “Department of Defense Dictionary.”

III. PEACEBUILDING TASKS

I initially believed that there were tasks in PBO that could be broken down into two basic groups – lead actor and supporting actor (s). I further assumed that there were certain tasks in which the military would be the lead actor, tasks for which IOs or ROs would take the lead, and tasks that NGOs would head. Because of the political, social, and economic elements of PBO, however, IOs and ROs must take the leading role in almost all aspects of PBO. Table 1 outlines the four basic elements of peacebuilding as described in the previous chapter, breaks each element further into its related subtasks, and assigns responsibility to the lead agency or supporting agency for each subtask.

What then is the military's role in PBO? Or, to ask an even more basic question, should the military be involved in PBO? A review of the National Security Strategy (NSS) will help to determine the rationale for military involvement in PBO. The NSS provides three core objectives for the new century: 1) To enhance America's security; 2) to bolster America's prosperity; and 3) to promote democracy and human rights abroad.²⁶

²⁶ "National Security Strategy Report: Preface," National Security Council. In the *White House Web Site*. Dec 1999. Available [Online] <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssrpref-1299.html>> [26 Sep 00].

Basic Elements of Peacebuilding	Actor	Military (US and other)	US Civilian Agencies	IOs and ROs	NGOs
SubTask					
Maintaining a Secure Environment	Monitor governing agreements	S	S	L	S
	Supervise disengagement and withdrawal	L	S	S	
	Supervise demobilization and demilitarization	L	S	S	
	Assist in the maintenance of public order	S	S	L	S
Rebuilding and Reconstruction of Governmental Institutions	Supervision of elections	S	S	L	S
	Transfer of authority	S	S	L	S
	Return of the rule of law	S	S	L	S
	Reestablishment of health care and educational institutions	S	S	L	S
Rebuilding and Reconstruction of Economic Institutions	Reestablishment of transportation infrastructure	S	S	L	S
	Redevelopment of utilities	S	S	L	S
	Development of economic and financial institutions	S	S	L	S
Reconciliation and Reconstruction of Civil Institutions	Conflict resolution and confidence building measures	S	S	S	L
	Reintegration of refugees, displaced persons, and combatants	S	S	L	S

L = Lead Agency S = Supporting Agency

Table 1. Roles in Peacebuilding Operations

It further states:

We must also sustain our commitment to America's diplomacy. Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, opening markets, and containing disease and hunger brings a sure return in security and long-term savings.... America must be willing to act alone when our interests demand it, but we should also support the institutions and arrangements through which other countries help us bear the burdens of leadership.... It is why we must do our part when others take the lead in building peace: whether Europeans in the Balkans, Asians in East Timor, or Africans in Sierra Leone. Otherwise we will be left with a choice in future crises between doing everything ourselves or doing nothing at all.²⁷

This document clearly illustrates the National Command Authority's commitment to the preservation of peace and stability in the world. If peace and stability are strategically important to the United States, then this sentiment must be prevalent in subsequent policy documents. The National Military Strategy maintains that in order "to protect and promote US national interests, our national military objectives are to Promote Peace and Stability and, when necessary, to Defeat Adversaries that threaten the United States, our interests, or our allies." It continues, "Promoting peace and stability means creating and sustaining security conditions globally, and in key regions, allowing the peaceful pursuit of our interests and the just resolution of international problems through political means. This does not imply a resistance to change; rather, it underscores a desire for peaceful change."²⁸ These two policy statements make clear that the military may be called for in PO in order to protect national interests. If the military is going to be involved in PO then it must be involved in PBO as well, since PBO are essential to the successful withdrawal of US military forces from an area of conflict. It is with this

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Shalikashvili, John M. "National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now -- A Military Strategy for a New Era." In the *Defense Technical Information Center Web Site*. December 1997. Available [Online] <<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/index.html>> [26 Sep 00].

understanding that this chapter will address the question, what are the roles and missions of the military in PBO?

Because PBO occur in a continuum that is event driven rather than conflict driven, the military's missions will vary based upon the situation and the time period in which they occur. With a self-sustaining, lasting peace as the goal, the military mission cannot focus solely on the establishment of a secure environment and the prevention of the re-emergence of violence. Efforts also must focus on creating a partnership with those authorities and civilian agencies responsible for stability and achieving the desired end-state.

A. CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION

FM 100-5, Operations, outlines principles that guide the Army's actions in both war fighting and MOOTW. Two of the principles, objective and unity of effort, are of particular concern to the military when it is involved in military support to civil authorities (MSCA) operations, interagency operations, and coalition operations. The principle of objective directs "every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."²⁹ Simply stated, each separate operation must be integrated and coordinated with every other operation to support the ultimate strategic goal of the campaign. Leaders at every level, both military and civilian, must understand the campaign goals, establish appropriate objectives, and ensure they all contribute to unity of effort with other agencies. This ties directly into the second principle, unity of effort,

²⁹ "Operations," Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, In the *General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library*. 14 June 1993. Available [Online]: <<http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-5/100-513b.htm>> [26 Sep 00]

which refers to “seeking unity of effort toward every objective.”³⁰ In MOOTW, this presents a challenge that is not usually encountered in warfighting – coordination with civilian agencies, which will often have primacy. Commanders must seek to form a cooperative relationship or partnership with these organizations, rather than relying on command authority to achieve the objectives by unity of effort.

General Wesley Clark, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stated during his Situational Report on Bosnia, 9 December 1999, “What we know is that most of the military tasks have been done, but not sustained. The civil implementation tasks have not been completed. We can’t, in the military, do the civil implementation tasks, but the civil implementation tasks can’t be done without the kind of secure environment that the military provides.”³¹ The failure to fully implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) can be attributed directly to the discontinuity of effort by all parties involved. NATO’s mission and objectives were clearly defined in the GFAP: NATO was to “assist in implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement.”³² The accords, however, provided a much more nebulous definition of the civilian mission. The High Representative’s mission was to “facilitate the Parties’ own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement by carrying out...the

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ “DoD News Briefing, Thursday, 9 December 1999, Presenter General Wesley Clark, CINCEUR and SACEUR,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). In the *Defense LINK Web Site*. 9 December 1999. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1999/t12091999_t-209clar.html> [19 May 00]

³² General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), Annex I-A, Article VI. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 11 December 1995.

[civilian] tasks.”³³ The weakness of the High Representative’s mandate, the absence of integrating structures at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and the virtual cornucopia of IOs, NGOs, and private companies involved, have created almost impossible circumstances in which civilian implementation must try to succeed. There is a divergence between the military implementation tasks and the civil implementation tasks necessary for promoting stability and ensuring a self-sustaining, lasting peace. Part of this disparity can be attributed to the military mission’s narrow focus on conflict prevention. The two parallel efforts, military and civil implementation, have no bridge linking them.

While the US military and civilian government agencies have procedures and principles that provide unity of effort and direction of the operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective, IOs, NGOs, private companies and other TCNs do not necessarily honor the same objectives and unity of effort. This often is the result of the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the participating organizations. Further complicating this problem of communication and coordination is the six-month rotation of US forces, while IOs, NGOs and local authorities maintain continuity in their efforts to build a lasting peace. These issues complicate the transition from “increasing consent” to “institutionalization of peace” along the peace continuum.

For unilateral US actions, Presidential Decision Directive/ National Security Council Memorandum 56 (PDD 56), “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” dated May 1997, provides the unity of effort and objective needed to build a lasting peace

³³ Ibid.

in regions of former conflict.³⁴ PDD 56 was designed to ensure that the lessons learned, both in planning and in implementation, would be incorporated into the interagency process on a regular basis. Its intent was to establish interagency management practices to achieve unity of effort among US government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. PDD 56 requires the development of a political-military implementation plan (pol-mil plan) for use as an integrated planning tool for coordinating US government actions in a complex contingency operation. The use of the pol-mil plan provides interagency coordination through effective management practices to perform centralized planning and decentralized execution during these complex operations.

While PDD-56 takes gigantic steps toward creating unity of effort among US government agencies, it does little to synchronize the efforts of IOs, NGOs and private companies over which it has little or no control. There must be an implementing agency within a complex contingency operation that can coordinate and synchronize the efforts of all the participants at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This is a role for the military in late stage PKO and early PBO, as the attempt is made to transition from “increasing consent” to “institutionalization of peace.”

A military force can prevent the re-emergence of violence; it cannot, however, build peace by itself. In conjunction with civilians and their governments, and with the support of IOs, ROs and NGOs, the military can help build a framework for lasting peace. Joulwan and Shoemaker present a strong argument for the establishment of an

³⁴ “Presidential Decision Directive/ National Security Council Memorandum 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” National Security Council. In the *White House Web Site*. May 1997. Available [Online]: <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDOC2.html>> [26 Sep 00]

effective civilian-military implementation staff (CMIS) as the essential force to shape successful operations to prevent the re-emergence of violence.³⁵ This concept must be taken further, however, because the goal of PBO has to include the establishment of a self-sustaining, lasting peace. Joulwan and Shoemaker argue that in order to prevent the re-emergence of violence, a comprehensive, integrated effort is necessary that harnesses and exploits the specific capabilities of international institutions, individual governments, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector across the spectrum of military, economic, political, social, psychological and informational issues. The success of this effort will depend on developing new ways of managing these activities, especially in regards to the command-and control structures for translating mandates and objectives into actions. While I concur with the establishment of the CMIS at the strategic level, where broad policy objectives are developed and promulgated, international coordination is effected at its most general level, resources are garnered, and the cooperation of nongovernmental organizations and the private sector is sought, the organization and coordination of all the range of agencies at the operational and tactical level is best left to the military through the redesign and retooling of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC).

Education and training can help overcome the institutional frictions bound to arise among participants, and help establish a workable partnership. Many civilian agencies strongly resist any requirement that they subordinate themselves to or even cooperate with a military chain of command. At the same time, military leaders often are equally reluctant to place themselves under the direction of civilian organizations, especially

³⁵ Joulwan and Shoemaker, "Civilian-Military Cooperation."

organizations that have international membership or are considered to have ill-informed, unorganized, and ill-advised civilian guidance. If these obstacles can be overcome, there are several reasons why the military is best suited for the coordination of operations-level functions. The military has a well-defined hierarchical structure and is able to respond on relatively short notice to fulfill a wide variety of missions and situations. The military can draw on the considerable experience of the National Guard in MSCA to meet the special requirements of the stability mission. The military is well suited for and has extensive experience in campaign planning, and has the capability and resources to perform coordination at the multi-organizational level. Civilian organizations, by contrast, often are more loosely organized than the military and generally lack sufficient resources to respond quickly to complex and dangerous situations. Furthermore, there are few civilian organizations that can coordinate multi-organizational operations.

Coordination and communication are the keys to success at the operational and tactical level. In Rwanda, a plethora of IOs and NGOs came together under the auspices of the US military and formed the CMOC, an agency concerned primarily with coordination and information. The CMOC coordinated a range of activities that focused on providing relief to the refugee camps. Initially manned solely by the military, the CMOC staff expanded to include civilian representatives. The primary coordinating tool of the CMOC was the daily meeting of the principle representatives of each of the major organizations – military and civilian – at which each participant became aware of the objectives and activities of the other participants.³⁶

³⁶ Ibid.

Synchronization, unity of effort, and unity of objectives can be achieved using this organizing mechanism. Through the establishment of a partnership with authorities and civilian agencies, where the focus of the CMOC is on coordination and two-way communication, the bridge between civilian implementation tasks and military implementation tasks can be established. Civilian organizations, by participating in these operations, will gain planning and coordination experience, and towards later stage PBO, as the military forces begin to withdraw, will be prepared to continue their coordination and cooperation to reach the ultimate objective, a lasting and stable peace.

B. PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF THE ENTITY ARMED FORCES

The professional training of the entity armed forces will greatly facilitate the consolidation of democracy and the establishment of a lasting peace. A more professional military is better trained and disciplined, less politicized and parochial, and therefore less likely to take sides in an internal conflict or to engage in rights abuses, which provoke internal opposition. A military disengaged from politics is less apt to be involved in internal repression, to provoke external conflicts or to resort to adventurism in foreign policy to increase domestic legitimacy. A more professional military could demand a smaller share of the budget, freeing up resources that can be used for other efforts towards the establishment of a stable peace.

The intent of such a mission in Bosnia would be the professional training of the officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps of the entity armed forces. This would include NCO primary and advanced education and officer primary, intermediate, and advanced education. This program must incorporate both the Army of the Republika Srpska and the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to succeed. The

combined education of the NCO and officer corps will maintain the impartiality of SFOR and will assist in the establishment of local coalitions for peace. The training will assist in providing education and professionalism to garner support for the peacebuilding process and consolidation of a lasting peace. The education process must maintain an integrated approach with civilian agencies. These agencies will need to provide a similar education program to the civilian leadership within the country based on the fundamentals of civilian control of the military and the planning and operation of the military in a democracy. This partnership will ensure that the increased professionalism of the armed forces is not lost on civilian leaders unfamiliar with and uneducated in the imperatives of civil-military relations.

The program must be tailored to the specific circumstances and needs of the Bosnian government. The ultimate aim of professionalization of the military is to make the military institution, as a whole, stronger, so that it may operate more consistently and effectively, use resources more efficiently, and become a more unified entity less at the mercy of factionalism. The program should follow the crawl, walk, run methodology. US and other military forces should provide the initial training for the educational program. A joint cadre of both US and other military forces and members of both of the entity armed forces should provide subsequent training. The operation of the educational program ultimately will be transferred completely to cadre from both of the entity armed forces.

C. CONTINUATION OF CERTAIN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Because PO occur along a continuum, there is not a precise point in time when PKO stops and PBO starts. It can be expected that some of the missions conducted in

PKO will continue during PBO. Some PK tasks will not be needed because of the change in the situation; other PK tasks will be modified to fit the situation. PK missions usually involve either observing and monitoring, or supervising and assisting parties formerly in the dispute. There must be continuity of operations between PKO and PBO. Table 2 outlines typical tasks included in PKO and PBO missions.

MISSION	TASKS
OBSERVATION	Observing, monitoring, verifying, and reporting any alleged violations of the governing agreements.
and MONITORING	Investigating, alleged cease-fire violations, boundary incidents, and complaints.
	Negotiating and mediating.
	Conducting regular liaison visits within the operational area.
	Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forces within the operational area.
	Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of military equipment specified in the relevant agreements.
SUPERVISION	Supervising cease-fires.
And ASSISTANCE	Supervising disengagements and withdrawals.
	Supervising prisoner of war exchanges.
	Supervision demobilization and demilitarization.
	Assisting civil authorities.
	Assisting in the maintenance of public order.
	Supporting foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

Table 2 – Peacekeeping Missions and Tasks³⁷

³⁷ "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures."

PBO are characterized by the institutionalization of peace. Military requirements gradually will diminish as the cease-fire becomes institutionalized. Implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace accord now begin to assume a much more prominent role as the foundation for an enduring peace is re-established, institutions are rebuilt, and procedures are re-developed. As this occurs, the military tasks to support this process also must change and evolve. Table 3 illustrates the changes in missions and tasks moving from PKO to PBO. Tasks identified in italics have a reduced prominence.

MISSION	TASKS
OBSERVATION	<i>Observing, monitoring, verifying, and reporting any alleged violations of the governing agreements.</i>
and MONITORING	<i>Investigating, alleged cease-fire violations, boundary incidents, and complaints.</i>
	Negotiating and mediating.
	Conducting regular liaison visits within the operational area.
	<i>Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forces within the operational area.</i>
	<i>Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of military equipment specified in the relevant agreements.</i>
SUPERVISION	Assisting civil authorities.
and ASSISTANCE	Assisting in the maintenance of public order.
	Supporting foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

Table 3 – Peacebuilding Missions and Tasks

Observing, monitoring, verifying and reporting any alleged violation of the governing agreements. This task will have a reduced prominence in PBO because the agreements – treaties, truces, cease-fires, arms control agreements and any other binding agreement between the disputing parties – will have become accepted and institutionalized. The time and effort that military forces will have to spend on this task will diminish.

Investigating alleged cease-fire violations, boundary incidents, and complaints. This is a reduced emphasis mission. Because of the institutionalization and acceptance of the governing agreements, violations of the agreements will be seldom; the military, in conjunction with the civilian authorities, however, needs to be prepared to investigate them if they do arise.

Negotiating and Mediating. This will become one of the most important tasks in PBO. Negotiation and mediation will have an effect on every one of the tasks listed in each PBO mission. Leaders and soldiers participating in PBO may undertake negotiations on behalf of the disputing parties to mediate low to medium-level disputes. The ability of leaders and soldiers to reconcile differences at the lowest possible levels will have a direct impact on the maintenance of a secure environment and reconciliation and reconstruction of civil institutions.

Conducting regular liaison visits within the operational area. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the cooperation and coordination of the military, the host nation government, IOs, ROs and NGOs is essential to the success of PBO. Liaison visits will maintain personal contact and allow for the timely exchange of information with all parties involved in PBO at the operational and tactical levels.

Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forces within the operational area. This task will have a reduced prominence in PBO because compliance with the provisions of the governing agreement by the former warring factions (FWF) will decrease the need for the military forces to supervise the disposition of FWF. Changes in the disposition of the FWF will reduce the requirement for visiting training bases. During the PBO, as compliance and acceptance among the FWF increases, the need for visits may change from periodic to occasional, to self-inspection with reporting, and finally, to no need to report status.

Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of military equipment. This task will have a reduced prominence in PBO because compliance with the provisions of the governing agreement by the FWF will decrease the necessity of the military forces to supervise the storage and destruction of equipment. As with the previous task, as compliance and acceptance among the FWF increases, the need for visits to verify storage and destruction may change over time from periodic to no need to report status.

Assisting civil authorities. This will be one of the largest tasks for units in PBO because PBO are largely civilian-led operations. PB forces may be required to continue to assist civilian authorities in the supervision of elections, transfer of authority, returns assessments and DPRES processing, and other functions. The assistance and support provided by both the military and civilian agencies to the host nation government will be reduced as the PBO continues. As the reconciliation and reconstruction process proceeds, more and more transfers of authority and battle hand-offs for tasks will go to the host nation.

Assisting in the maintenance of public order. Although the responsibility for public order rests solely with the civilian police, the presence of reconnaissance and security (R&S) patrols increases confidence in the maintenance of a secure environment. Additionally, until the civilian police can establish cooperation pacts and emergency response plans with other local municipalities in the event of a situation beyond the local police's capacity to respond, military assistance may be required. As the International Police Task Force (IPTF) begins to accomplish its mission, to provide trained and competent police officers for local governments, local police officers should be integrated into R&S patrols in the towns. As the civilian population begins to gain confidence in the local police, patrolling gradually should be transferred away from the military.

Supporting foreign humanitarian assistance operations. PB is not a job the military can do alone. The military therefore needs to cooperate and coordinate operations with IOs, ROs and NGOs. PB forces may provide security and transportation for NGOs and other agencies while they are performing their functions. Military forces also may be used to assist NGOs in the accomplishment of their missions. An NGO, for example, wants to re-establish agriculture in a local community. Some sections of the community are dedicated to growing operations, while another section of the community is dedicated to animal husbandry. The NGO wants to vaccinate the livestock against disease but the town doesn't have a veterinarian. If the NGO were to provide the serum, either civil affairs personnel (Veterinarian MOSSs) or medical personnel (Medical MOSSs) could use this as a training opportunity and assist the NGO and the community with their missions. The medical personnel would get valuable training in giving injections (using the animals as training aids), the NGO would be able to ensure the livestock are

protected, and the community would be able to start rebuilding its economic base. Reconciliation within the community could increase through interdependence and cooperation for survival. There are many circumstances similar to the above scenario, in which the military can provide support to humanitarian assistance operations while gaining valuable training.

D. SUMMARY

The missions that the military will perform during PBO will vary based upon the situation and the time period in which they occur. The desired end-state of PBO is a self-sustaining, lasting peace. In addition to maintaining a secure environment and preventing the re-emergence of violence, military missions also must focus on creating a partnership with the authorities and civilian agencies responsible for stability and achieving the desired end-state.

Some of the missions conducted in PKO will continue during PBO. Some PK tasks will not be needed because of the change in the situation and others will be modified to fit the situation. Professional training of the entity armed forces will contribute to the consolidation of democracy and the establishment of a self-sustaining, lasting peace. The combined education of the NCO and officer corps will maintain the impartiality of SFOR and will assist in the establishment of local coalitions for peace. Increased education and professionalism in the entity armed forces will help to support the peacebuilding process and the consolidation of peace, leading to the establishment of a self-sustaining, lasting peace.

The most useful role the military can play in PBO is to coordinate and communicate the objectives and operations of the different participants in the

peacebuilding process. The military has a well-defined hierarchical structure and is able to respond on relatively short notice to fulfill a wide variety of missions in various situations. Military leaders can draw on broad experience to meet the special requirements of the stability mission and for campaign planning. The redesign and retooling of the Civil Military Operations Center will promote a partnership between the military and civilian agencies to improve synchronization, unity of effort, and unity of objective. Through such a partnership within the CMOC, a bridge between civilian implementation tasks and military implementation tasks can be established that will lead to a self-sustaining and lasting peace.

IV. PEACEBUILDING TRAINING

FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, provides the best framework for developing and executing a training plan. Although FM 25-101 was written and developed during the late 1980s for a Cold War threat, it remains the current Army doctrine for the planning and execution of training and is applicable for the development of training plans for PBO.

The Army training management cycle establishes a sound approach for preparing a unit to accomplish a mission. The first two essential steps in the training management cycle are: 1) Developing and gaining approval of the unit mission essential task list (METL); and 2) preparing a training assessment. These steps are essential because they

Training Management Cycle




Figure 3 – Training Management Cycle

identify the major tasks that the unit must be able to perform and identify the unit's strengths and weaknesses in performing those tasks.

Based on the METL and the assessment, the commander – with the support of the higher headquarters – will develop a training strategy that will achieve the desired level of proficiency of mission essential tasks. The training strategy determines the training events and activities to increase or maintain proficiency and supports the unit's goals and objectives.³⁸

A cornerstone of the METL development is mission analysis. Commanders and senior leaders should conduct mission analysis as early as possible to determine the tasks they must accomplish during PBO. Because of the dynamic nature of PBO, an independent mission analysis is imperative. Additionally, mission analysis will provide the leadership with a current reflection of the conditions and the environment, as well as a thorough understanding of the mission.

Mission analysis and METL development are the purview of command; this thesis therefore will not attempt to circumvent the doctrinal basis of FM 25-101. This portion of the thesis will, however, attempt to provide commanders with a resource to achieve “battle focus” for PBO. Battle focus is the concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from the mission analysis process and drives the METL development process. Units cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on all possible soldier, leader, and collective tasks. Commanders must selectively identify and train on those tasks that accomplish the unit's critical mission. The METL serves as the focal point by which commanders plan, execute, and assess training. This is critical throughout

³⁸ “Battle Focused Training.”

the entire training process and aids commanders in allocating resources for training. It also enables the commander to tailor the unit development training for those leader competencies that require executing Army doctrine. Critical to the battle focus concept is understanding the linkage between the collective mission essential tasks and the leader and soldier tasks that support them.³⁹

To reach the desired end-state and be successful in late-stage peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations requires more than just training. Soldiers and leaders must be capable of making decisions without a preconceived scenario by which they have been trained in how to react. Joint Vision 2020 recognizes this issue and states, “Individuals will be challenged by significant responsibilities at tactical levels in the organization and must be capable of making decisions with both operational and strategic implications.”⁴⁰ The ability to make the correct or the most correct decision in these situations does not happen by luck or coincidence; rather, it comes from a base or foundation of knowledge and education used in concert with training to develop the necessary skills.

This chapter will look at the considerations involved in developing a training plan for PBO. It will suggest and examine leader and soldier tasks that will facilitate the successful completion of mission essential tasks in a PBO environment, regardless of the specific METL tasks. The focus of the education and training will be on tasks that prepare leaders and soldiers for creating the conditions necessary to perform as effective partners with authorities and civilian agencies. The training also will give soldiers and

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ “Joint Vision 2020,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense. In the *Joint Doctrine Homepage*. June 2000. Available [Online]: <<http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/jvpub2.htm>> [3 Nov 00]

leaders a foundation of knowledge on which to base their judgment when they respond to situations for which there are no clear-cut solutions.

A. CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING THE TRAINING PLAN

1. Training Methods

Front-Loaded Training. This method of training focuses on teaching selected tasks from the beginning of the training cycle. This initial emphasis allows the unit to have continuous exposure to the tasks during the entire cycle. The benefit of this training method is that through the repetition of these tasks, greater familiarity is developed in the performance or use of the required skills. Additionally, the SKA may have an impact on the subsequent training tasks. Two potential applications of this method in PBO are cultural awareness and the rules of engagement. Constant reinforcement of given concepts and tasks throughout the training cycle will create a heightened sense of awareness and institutionalization of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and the estimate process during training and during deployment in theater.

Progressive and Sequential. This method of training focuses on certain tasks that continue throughout the training cycle, with each new training event building on previous tasks. The benefit of this training method allows complex tasks to be understood in smaller manageable sub-tasks. The fundamental principle in this training method is that each subtask is necessary for the completion of the larger task. A potential application of this method in PBO is negotiation and mediation training. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for participating in negotiation, where the leaders are interested parties attempting to seek particular objectives, are different from the TTPs for participating in mediation, where military participants are a third party attempting to achieve a solution

for the other two parties involved that promotes stability and is satisfactory to all participants. Only through first understanding the basic principles of negotiation, then the TTPs for negotiation, then the basic principles of mediation, then the TTPs for mediation, then the socio-economic and political environment in which these actions take place, can a leader succeed at accomplishing the larger task of conducting negotiations.

Simultaneous, Multi-echelon. This is the simultaneous training of more than one level on different tasks. Multi-echelon training is a principle outlined in FM 25-100, “Battle Focused Training,” and should be used at all times. Multi-echelon training will maximize training resources and is the most effective method to train and sustain each level of the unit. The use of multi-echelon training is imperative in PBO because of the decentralized nature of the operations and the political characteristics of the environment. The planning and preparation at the division level has a direct effect on the reconnaissance and security patrol performed by a section and vice versa.

Back-loaded Training. This method of training arises from the inability, for various reasons, to train on certain tasks until arrival in theater. In PBO, however, certain training may be performed upon arrival in order to place greater emphasis on its significance and practicality. Two potential applications of this method in PBO are NGO/IO relationships and political, economic, and cultural awareness of the specific area of responsibility (AOR). This method might be employed in order to involve the NGOs and IOs in the training process, to allow them to provide their own overview of their operations and organization, and to provide more area-specific training once the leaders and soldiers have had an opportunity to view the AOR. Back-loaded training also can be

an essential element of the training cycle, in which personnel prepare, execute and evaluate the training plan, conduct unit assessment, and prepare training assessment.

While peace operations training is based on the current situation and the most probable course of action, the situation is changing and dynamic. Back-loaded training is a method that allows for innovation and adaptation. During the training and education process in preparation for peacebuilding operations, leaders and soldiers develop knowledge and skills for the mission, they practice and rehearse for that mission, and then they perform that mission in theater. Back-loaded training allows for the capitalization and dissemination of the successes, and modification and adaptation of the failures for greater mission accomplishment.

As with warfighting missions, the method of training is important because it provides a framework and builds a logical sequence for the progression of training in preparation for the mission. The training method employed plays a critical role in perfecting individual specialties and the development of core competencies for every organization and individual involved in undertaking PBO. Front-loading much of the education and training on the mission-enabling tasks will improve the ability of soldiers and leaders to confront the diversity of missions in the PBO environment, and allow for adaptability, innovation, precise judgment, forward thinking, and multicultural understanding to successfully complete the mission.

2. Training Realism and Operational Tempo

Units should train in peacetime as they will fight during war. Peacetime training must replicate battlefield conditions. All training is based on this

principle. Leaders must ensure that soldiers are trained to cope with complex, stressful, and lethal situations they will encounter in combat.⁴¹

Although the complexities, stresses, and lethality of operations in PBO are different from warfighting missions, the principle that training should reflect actual conditions is essential to any successful training plan. PBO present their own complexities and stresses, for which leaders and soldiers must be prepared. To the extent possible, therefore, the training environment should replicate conditions in the assigned sector of operations. Training resources should be secured that are as close to the operational environment as possible. Because most PBO occur in populated, urban areas, training areas that represent this type of environment can be found almost anywhere in the continental United States. The procedures needed to secure these training areas can provide leaders with additional experience in how to coordinate with civil authorities that will be beneficial in PBO.

Commanders must plan how they will maintain an appropriate operational tempo (OPTEMPO) during training events. The current approach taken by the Army focuses on being prepared for worst case scenarios and then lowering the pace after arriving in theater to match less demanding requirements. Another approach provides the training OPTEMPO that reflects the actual pace of operations in theater, regardless of the speed of the action. There are opposing arguments about which of these approaches is preferable. If the training pace is too slow, the unit may not be prepared for crises should they occur. If, however, the pace is extremely strenuous and crisis-driven, soldiers may

⁴¹ "Battle Focused Training."

be prepared for any eventuality, but may also overreact and be inclined to respond to minor incidents as if they were worst-case scenarios.

Dr. S. E. Archer wrote, “Most common comment was that the training focused too exclusively on the worst case scenario events and not enough on the actual situations they are seeing that are far less intense/ threatening than what their training led them to expect.” This sentiment was echoed during an interview with CPT Kendric Robbins and 1SG Abraham Gonzalez in Bosnia.⁴² Both commented on how the training was geared for the worst-case scenario. Such a crisis situation occurred only once during their nine-month rotation and even that event did not approach the worst-case scenario portrayed in the training process. According to Robbins and Gonzales, “The training should be good enough that soldiers will be able to turn up the intensity level if the situation arises.”⁴³ During an interview with Dr. Archer in April 2000, LTC Brown, 49th AD G-5, and LTC Rutherford, 49th AD G-3, stated, “Focusing only on the worst-case scenarios does not give a realistic picture of what is going on in Bosnia at this time. As a result of the worst-case scenario focus, the forces got here all spun up to conflict level which is totally unrealistic and makes it hard for them to cope with the much lower threat level in Bosnia at this time.” When soldiers arrive in country and find a much lower threat level than they were trained to expect, they begin to question the validity of all of their training.⁴⁴

Both Dr. Archer’s and my findings reflect an overemphasis on framing situations for the worst-case scenario. To better prepare leaders and soldiers for PBO, training

⁴² Archer, “Bosnia Report.”

⁴³ CPT Robbins , and Gonzalez, Abraham 1SG, Troop K First Sergeant 3/3 ACR. Personal Interview, 6 September 2000, Camp Dobol, Bosnia

⁴⁴ Archer, “Bosnia Report.”

events should vary the tempo of operations. One method to allow preparation for the worst-case scenario while still reflecting the actual pace of operations is to allow for multiple outcomes during a single training event. This concept would be included within the STX lanes, as well as the Staff Training Exercise Vignettes and MRE. During the development of master events lists, exercise planners should vary the response of the opposing forces (OPFOR) / role players. During an iteration of the exercise or during one vignette, OPFOR/ role players respond in the worst-case scenario. At another time, the OPFOR/ role players respond with the best-case scenario. Most of the time, they respond with the most probable course of action based on the latest intelligence from the theater. Using this type of challenging, unpredictable, and ambiguous training event, leaders and soldiers will gain increased flexibility and agility. Further, should they overreact in these hypothetical situations, results will illustrate the operational and strategic consequences of their actions, further requiring the staff and subordinate commanders to coordinate and synchronize their responses to the events. By training this way, soldiers and leaders are prepared for the worst-case scenario should it occur, while at the same time are allowed to use their judgment and initiative to respond to situations under a variety of conditions, and better prepare for the OPTEMPO and threat they most probably will face in theater.

3. Training at the Appropriate Level

The training management cycle requires the development of a training plan that focuses not only on the essential tasks required to accomplish the mission, but also on training at the proper level. In Bosnia, a Staff Sergeant negotiates directly with the mayor and local police chief in villages throughout the unit's area of responsibility. A Second Lieutenant conducts weapon storage site inspections and monitors training of the entity

armed forces. These examples illustrate the variety and importance of tasks assigned to junior leaders. Because of the ambiguity and unique complexities of PBO missions, and their social and political sensitivities, the behavior of each individual soldier potentially has strategically significant consequences. Large areas of responsibility dictate using a decentralized operation. The level of responsibility for decision-making is pushed down to the squad and section leader, especially in light of the ongoing reduction in ground troops. It is crucial that the level of leader training correspond to the operational imperatives.

Despite these realities on the ground, the Army has not systematically assessed the implications of these characteristics for leadership training. "Training aimed at the platoon leader needs to be forwarded on to the squad leader and section leader level," suggested Major Gregory Julian during an interview at Camp Dobol, Bosnia.⁴⁵ During preparations for the SFOR rotation, 3/3 planned and trained to conduct operations at the platoon level; upon arrival in theater, however, they had to break down into two vehicle sections and operated at that level. Squad leaders and section leaders did not receive the training and practical exercises that prepared the platoon leaders for their tasks. They acquired the SKAs necessary for the conduct of the mission by observing from the tank commander's hatch and learning on the fly. LTC Rutherford, 49th AD G-3, also related this experience to Dr. Archer in April 2000:

The real gap in training is with NCOs, lieutenants, and captains, the people who are on the interface between military and civilians on patrols and at the gates on a daily basis. These soldiers must be trained more extensively so that they can work effectively with IOs, NGOs, and civilians. The training that majors and above received was good, but the

⁴⁵ Julian, Gregory MAJ, S-3 3/3 ACR. Personal Interview, 6 September 2000, Camp Dobol, Bosnia.

lower ranks need this training. Exercises must include vignettes for all levels of soldiers that address working with IOs, NGOs, and civilians in a variety of settings – streets, gate, meetings, stores, etc.⁴⁶

The principle of “train as you fight” states that peacetime training must replicate battlefield conditions.⁴⁷ This refers not only to replicating the realism of battlefield conditions, but also to ensuring that soldiers and leaders are trained on the tasks that they are expected to perform in combat. The level of training must reflect the level of performance. Captains, lieutenants, and NCOs are now performing tasks in IFOR and initial SFOR rotations that were the responsibility of majors and lieutenant colonels. It is imperative that they receive the training and education that will ensure they can “hit the ground running” and build on the success of their predecessors.

B. MISSION ENABLING TASKS

The Army currently is providing excellent training to its leaders and soldiers so they can perform specified tasks and react to certain situations in order to suppress or prevent the reemergence of armed conflict. This training, however, is insufficient to support the desired end-state of PBO – establishment of a self-sustaining peace. The Army needs to give soldiers and leaders the education, knowledge, and training to respond to situations where there is no clear cut solution, and prepare them to become effective partners with local authorities and civilian agencies to support the mission objectives. Many mission enabling tasks were identified during interviews with leaders and soldiers in Bosnia that would facilitate the accomplishment of most, if not all, PBO

⁴⁶ Archer, “Bosnia Report.”

⁴⁷ “Battle Focused Training.”

mission essential tasks, and achieve the desired end state of a stable peace. Most leaders said that they learned their skills either during the “right seat ride” process or while they were “on the ground.” Because of the reduction in deployment cycles, by the time leaders are proficient in these skills they are beginning to rotate out. Increased training and education that focus on PBO-specific tasks will provide leaders and soldiers with the SKAs to succeed in complex and politically sensitive PBO missions.

1. Cultural Awareness

PBO training is dramatically different from tactical warfighting training. Leaders and soldiers require a greater knowledge of the area of operations than just the opposing forces, the terrain and the weather impacts to operations. Because PBOs are political operations, it is important to teach leaders and soldiers about the political, cultural, and historical background of the area of operations. In contrast to a warfighting mission, it is the integration of the political, social, economic, and historical elements that will provide leaders and soldiers with the inputs to the “estimate process” in PBO. The political, cultural, and economic dynamics become the terrain and weather for the leaders’ application of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, Troops Available, Courses of Action (METT-TC). They should have a thorough understanding of the historical roots of the conflict and the interests of key actors in the area of responsibility. Dr. Archer noted that “a number of NCOs, Lieutenants, and Captains with whom I talked said that they did not know enough about Bosnia or why US forces are deployed here. NCO and junior officers are often those soldiers who have the most frequent and direct contact with local people

on guard duty, dismounted patrols, as drivers, etc.”⁴⁸ COL Fuske, a Norwegian liaison officer working in Multinational Division North, articulated the importance of cultural awareness to Dr. Archer:

Training must help troops understand the way people here think, their values. The past is tremendously important, as are human relationships, and hospitality. Soldiers cannot really understand the situation and people until they are here, but you can give them some background, which will make the process faster and easier. US troops think of present and future. You must help troops recognize this difference and overcome their ethnocentrism.⁴⁹

It is essential that soldiers have a grasp of the historical and cultural aspects of the area of responsibility in order to understand how the conflict arose and how the actions that they take may assist in promoting a self-sustaining, lasting peace.

Currently, cultural awareness is provided to leaders and soldiers through the Peace Support Operations Exercise and Seminar provided by the BCTP, S-2 Area Briefings, institutional knowledge of soldiers previously deployed to the area of operations, and self-directed reading and study programs. These are commendable training events; most soldiers on the ground in Bosnia, however, revealed that the effectiveness of these training events varies depending on one’s level in the organization, and are inadequate preparation for the mission. A more effective method of training is necessary, given the limited time available during the train-up process. As CSM Hardy of 3/3 ACR said, “You don’t have a college quarter’s worth of time to prepare soldiers, you

⁴⁸ Archer, Bosnia Report.”

⁴⁹ Ibid.

can only scratch the surface; therefore, you need to make sure you focus on the most important aspects. You need to give them the why.”⁵⁰

The BCTP program provides an excellent overview conducted by contracted subject matter experts very knowledgeable in the area of operations. BCTP is a “train the trainer” program given only to staff and key leaders. Unfortunately, one hour-long cultural awareness briefing is insufficient to prepare someone to further train soldiers on the cultural impacts of a mission such as PBO. Additionally, whether a graduate school student or an infantry fire team leader, sitting in a classroom and hearing a one to two hour lecture allows for the retention of approximately 50% of the information given. It also is not realistic to expect soldiers to give sufficient attention to a self-paced study program with a reading list, in addition to the disruption of leaving families and jobs, and the many other requirements placed upon them for a deployment. Given these obstacles, we need to find better methods to improve cultural awareness training. The following recommendations can be implemented fairly quickly and without great expense:

- **BCTP.** No change to the BCTP. This is valuable training and its benefits for Battalion-level and above staff are immeasurable. The only recommended change to the current program would be to increase the time allotted in order to incorporate a facilitated discussion of the impacts of culture, history, politics, economics, and society on the successful completion of the mission.

⁵⁰ Hardy, Lonnie A. CSM, 3/3 ACR. Personal Interview, 6 September 2000, Camp Dobol, Bosnia. See also Archer, “Bosnia Report.” Those I interviewed repeatedly stated that the cultural awareness training at the level it is provided is excellent, but that it needs to be provided to the lower levels in a more interactive format rather than an hour session in the “transmit only” mode.

- **S-2 Briefings.** Focus on the big picture for the country. Why did the FWF go to war? What are the primary political, religious, and ethnic differences among the indigenous population? Why do the various groups involved hate each other? What are the United States, NATO, and the UN attempting to accomplish? Spend most of the time on the specific AOR: Geography and demographics; how the big picture issues affect operations; the cultural courtesies and protocols most likely encountered in that AOR; and the current problems and issues there. As with the BCTP, the training should not be lecture based, but rather facilitated and interactive. United States history, such as the period after the Civil War or the problems faced by Japanese-Americans and German-Americans during World War II, could be an excellent tool for increasing understanding of issues in the target country.
- **Institutional Knowledge.** Attempts should be made to increase the use of institutional knowledge. Soldiers, especially, will learn more from their peers than from books. Bringing in soldiers with prior experience in the area of operations to assist the S-2 during instruction could be very beneficial. The only caution is that because peace operations occur along a continuum of events, the situation as it existed in the initial rotations of a PKO might have changed considerably as the conflict moves towards late PKO and early PBO.
- **Reading Lists.** This tool should continue to be available for personnel who wish to gain a greater understanding of the area of operations. In addition, however, summaries of the key area books should be provided to leaders and soldiers. A 250-page book transformed into a 50-page (or shorter) summary,

similar to “Cliff Notes®,” would have a greater chance of being read. These summaries, in turn, need to be at the reading level of most soldiers, to further improve the soldiers’ comprehension.

While cultural awareness training should be “front loaded,” so that its benefits can be integrated into the entire train-up process, once the unit arrives in theater, perhaps on day three or four, soldiers should receive a refresher or orientation course. Once soldiers are in theater and can see the effects of war on the country, and also whatever progress has been made towards reconciliation, they will be better able to understand the effects of indigenous culture, politics, and economics on the outcome of their mission.

Increased cultural awareness training at all levels can provide soldiers and leaders with a foundation on which to base their judgment when responding to situations for which there are not clear cut solutions.

2. Use of Interpreters

It is estimated that less than one percent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina speaks English; therefore, the effective use of an interpreter is essential. Effective interpreting, however, goes beyond the interpretation of the language. This is one area where I feel we are not properly educating our leaders and soldiers. There are common sense skills that need to be learned for using an interpreter effectively: Pause between statements, similarly to radio traffic, so that the interpreter is able to remember everything that was said; make comments directly to the person one is talking with, not to the interpreter; and enunciate slowly, just as if speaking on the radio. These are simple but important skills that can be learned quickly on the ground.

2LT William Wright stated, "What I did not know prior to arrival and what I was not prepared for in training, was how I could use my assigned interpreter to provide me with situational awareness."⁵¹ It is exactly this role of the interpreter for which leaders and soldier require additional education and training. 2LT Wright continued, "Most of the interpreters have been working in the AOR for 5 years, and you are probably the fourth or fifth SFOR soldier they have worked with. They know who the local police and politicians are, what their attitude is, and where they are located. They are another resource at your disposal."⁵² Interpreters can provide institutional knowledge to soldiers and leaders and provide them with important insights on different aspects of the situations that they may face: What can I expect from this person, what is my best method to get the information from him, and what will his attitude be regarding this? Dr. Archer discovered in her interviews with TRW interpreters that they feel that the interpreters can be of more use to soldiers and leaders:

[We] need to make clear that we are interpreters, not just translators of conversations verbatim. We need to be able to give our opinions, feeling, etc., as well as interpret what people say. Interpreters told me that they have been warned that their contract clearly states that they could be dismissed for appearing to take sides in meeting with local people. There are situations where because they are part of the indigenous culture they are alerted to potential hazards/ threats that are not apparent to others. They feel obligated to report their "gut feelings" since, if they are right, there is a threat and soldiers must be alerted. One said "I got into trouble because when I warned the soldiers that the people talking to them were lying and were a threat, I was accused of taking sides. How can I warn soldiers of possible danger if I am afraid to tell them what I think or feel in a situation?"⁵³

⁵¹ Wright, William C 2LT, HHT 3/3 ACR. Personal Interview, 6 September 2000, Camp Dobol, Bosnia.

⁵² Ibid.

Soldiers and leaders need to be aware that interpreters provide a valuable function other than simply interpreting the words verbatim. They also can confide non-verbal communication, give cultural context to the situation, provide instruction or suggestions on social customs, and offer intuitive insight on potential threat increases.

The role of interpreters at STX and MRE needs to be increased. Personnel used as interpreter role players need to function the same way they do in theater, by providing these additional insights. Leaders should be prepared to make decisions based on the reliability of the information provided and use this as another tool to estimate the situation.

2. IO – NGO Relationships

The second greatest casualty of reduced deployments, next to the interpersonal relationships built with the local community, is the IO – NGO to military relationship. As discussed in the previous chapter, becoming part of an effective team with these organizations is one of the primary tasks facing the military in PBO. Not only do the senior leaders need to understand the roles and missions of the various IO-NGOs in the area of operations, but each soldier and leader at all levels also needs to be familiar with the roles, missions, and organizations of the NGOs and IOs operating in their respective AORs. As Dr. John Finney, MND (N) Political Advisor, stated to Dr. Archer during their interview in April 2000:

The International Community (IC) and the military have different “battle rhythms” which can complicate communications and coordination. The military is here for a seven-month sprint. ICs are here for long distance, if not marathon, duration since IC personnel are here for a much longer time

⁵³ Archer, “Bosnia Report.”

– individuals for 18 months and organizations forever, essentially. SFOR has different resources for planning, etc., than do ICs – each must realize the other's different style and learn to share resources and work together. Must stress to new SFOR that working with ICs is much harder than they think and help them understand what to expect, that the two groups have differences – listen, ask questions, then comment.⁵⁴

Each community, the military and the NGOs/ IOs, are pursuing the desired end-state, a self-sustaining, lasting peace. A better understanding of the TTP of the other organizations will improve the working relationship between all of them.

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is the means by which the military commander establishes formal relations with the national government, civilian population, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations in an area where military forces are employed. The short-term aim of CIMIC is to enlist and maintain the full cooperation of the civilian populations and institutions within a given AOR to create conditions that give the commander an advantage. The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of a lasting solution to the crises.⁵⁵ CIMIC activities fall within the responsibility of the G-5, Civil Military Staff Officer and Civil Affairs units assigned to the theater. At the tactical level in Bosnia, Civil Affairs Tactical Support Teams (TST) who conduct CIMIC are responsible for all civil-military operations throughout the opstinas (regions or towns) that comprise the area of responsibility. This includes liaison with civil authorities, the international community, and the local populace. Organizations operating in Bosnia, for

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ "CIMIC – Civil and Military Cooperation," Swedish Armed Forces, Central Joint Command. In the *CIMIC Exercise Viking 99 Web Page*. 29 October 1999. Available [Online]: <<http://www.mil.se/pfp/viking99/conccim.html>> [5 Nov 00]

example, include the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia- Herzegovina, IPTF, the European Union, and other TCN.

It is not reasonable to believe that teams consisting of approximately nine to twelve soldiers can perform all the CIMIC activities in an AOR consisting of up to 15 opstinas. By teaching all soldiers and leaders to understand the roles of IOs/ NGOs, the efforts of the TSTs can be directed to larger issues, while minor issues can be handled by the soldiers and leaders on patrols, at the gates, or in the markets. As described by SSG Robin Bolmer, when soldiers and leaders on patrol are contacted by an individual about a problem, they take the person's information. Upon return to the base camp, they pass the information to the S-3, who in turn forwards it to the G-5, who passes the information over to civil affairs. Once the information is passed up the chain of command, the ones who originally were contacted have no idea whether anyone actually gets in touch with the person who needed the assistance.⁵⁶ It would better facilitate the peace process if leaders and soldiers were informed upon arrival in theater of who the major NGO/ IOs are in the area, what their specialization or mission is, where they are headquartered and how to contact them. Leaders and soldiers could carry reference cards, so that when stopped by someone looking for assistance, they could provide that person with the name of an organization, a point of contact, and a way to reach that organization for greater assistance. This is an example of how "back-loaded" training, conducted in theater, might be more effective than pre-deployment training. It would allow the NGOs and IOs

⁵⁶ Bolmer, interview.

operating within the AOR to provide their own overview of their operations and organization to those most directly in need of the information.

Greater understanding of these organizations also will lead to increased coordination while in theater. According to MAJ Julian, “We need to provide training on who these organizations are, what are their missions, how they are organized and who they report to, and who is responsible for each AOR.”⁵⁷ In his opinion, if we gave our soldiers and leaders this information, not only would they know to whom to direct local civilian requests for assistance, they also would know with whom to discuss specific issues in local towns without disturbing town administrators. If SFOR, NGOs and IOs can share information and cross coordinate, each organization will be able to maintain situational awareness within the AOR without placing an undo burden on the local officials. One example would be meeting with SFOR to tell them the same information that was just told to OSCE two days earlier. CPT Robbins described how they are putting this concept into practice at Camp Dobol, “We try not to bother the local officials too much, unless it’s really important. If you meet with them too much, they can’t do their jobs.” 1SG Gonzalez added “You have to learn to use the system that is in place and cross-coordinate with the NGOs and IC. They ask for security assessments before returns to our AOR and we ask for information from them; this way we both maintain awareness of what’s going on.”⁵⁸ This procedure, which is being used effectively at Camp Dobol, needs to be shared with other units and subsequent leaders. But it cannot be effective if,

⁵⁷ MAJ Julian, interview.

⁵⁸ CPT Robbins and 1SG Gonzalez, interview..

as CPT Robbins and 1SG Gonzalez found, it takes three months to figure out which organizations are responsible for what different activities.

3. Negotiation Training

In the traditional warfighting mission, the use of force is the primary means to pursue policy objectives. In PO, however, the use of force, or the capability to use force, while still an important aspect of the mission, is not the primary means to pursue policy objectives. The process of institutionalization and reconciliation without resorting to conflict or use of force characterizes PBO. It is essential, therefore, to train all leaders and soldiers on the use of negotiation and conflict resolution skills, under what may often be very trying circumstances. LTC Christopher S. Cole, a Staff Judge Advocate, pointed out, “During the claims process, negotiation skills and the ability to resolve conflict is incredibly important. But anytime you are dealing with an hysterical, ‘irrational’ person, negotiation skills and training are important.”⁵⁹ This call for negotiation training was repeated by CPT Robbins, “We need to spend more time on negotiation skills, especially at the lower ranks. Because there is not as much conflict as was presented in the training, you can get more accomplished through negotiation than you can through the use of force.”⁶⁰

Negotiation training currently is provided in BCTP seminars to senior leaders. Shifts in operations, however, place the responsibility for conducting negotiations with junior officers and NCOs. Leaders and soldiers expressed the need for greater

⁵⁹ Cole, Christopher S. LTC, Staff Judge Advocate for the 49th AD. Personal interview, 5 September 2000, Eagle Base, Tuzla, Bosnia

⁶⁰ CPT Robbins, interview.

negotiations training, not only for the peaceful resolution of conflicts that may arise, but for the ability to draw intentions from people when talking to them and get the information required without seeming pushy.⁶¹

Negotiation is a complicated process. Two-party negotiation differs greatly from three-party negotiation: Playing the role of mediator, maintaining a neutral stance and working towards a peaceful, fair solution. Through training and education, junior leaders can develop the “SPORTS” (immediate action for a misfire on an M16) technique for negotiation tasks to be implemented on the ground: Familiarizing leaders and soldiers with the importance of actions that take place outside of the negotiations, and how events preceding the actual negotiation can affect the eventual outcome of the negotiations (circumnegotiations); training potential mediators on the importance of getting past the positions of each of the parties and looking for the interests of each in the negotiation process; and educating potential mediators to look for the zone of potential agreement between the two parties. If the training situations reflect the situation on the ground, mediators will become skillful at using these tactics in negotiation and will develop their own TTP for use when exercising negotiations in theater.

C. SUMMARY

JV 2020 says that military personnel will require a multitude of skills. It states, “Our service members must have the mental agility to transition from preparing for war to enforcing peace to actual combat, when necessary.”⁶² In order to fulfill this requirement, training and education programs must instill demonstrated tactical and

⁶¹ This finding on the need for better negotiation training is supported by Dr. Archer’s research. Archer, “Bosnia Report.”

⁶² “Joint Vision 2020.”

technical competence, confidence, and initiative in our soldiers and their leaders. In order better to prepare these personnel for peacebuilding operations, it is essential that they receive a solid foundation of knowledge, skills and training that prepare them to respond to complex and politically highly sensitive environments. They must be able to think for themselves in situations where there is not a predefined desirable outcome. Soldiers and leaders also must have the skills to become effective partners with local authorities and civilian agencies to support the mission objectives.

Just as in a combat environment, leaders in PBO must prepare an estimate of the situation and map the “battlefield” during the decision making process. Combat leaders use the principles of METT-TC and OCOKA (Obstacles, Cover and Concealment, Observation and Fields of Fire, Key Terrain, and Avenues of Approach) to perform a hasty estimate of the situation. Leaders training at a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) cannot respond to a situation the same way that they would at a National Training Center. The two situations and environments are totally different; leaders, therefore, use these assessment tools to determine the appropriate action for their element to take. The same is true for PBO. Soldiers and leaders must have the foundation of knowledge and skills that allows them to use these tools to determine the appropriate action for their element to take in a given situation. Cultural awareness, the roles of IOs and NGOs, negotiation techniques and the use of interpreters all provide the leader with the inputs for METT-TC and OCOKA in a PBO environment. The possibility of multiple responses to the same training scenario will teach soldiers and leaders to draw on different inputs – socio-economic, political and historical conditions, and local actors – for the METT-TC

and OCOKA process, and will ensure that they know how to cope effectively with a range of possible situations.⁶³

Most of the leaders interviewed in Bosnia said that they learned most of these skills either during the “right seat ride” process or while they were “on the ground.” With the reduced deployment cycles, however, by the time leaders are proficient in these skills they are beginning to rotate out. More and better training and education on these specialized PBO tasks will provide leaders and soldiers with the knowledge and skills to succeed in complex and politically sensitive PBO missions. They will have the tools they need to be effective partners with the local authorities and civilian agencies that are working to create the conditions for a self-sustaining and lasting peace.

⁶³ Segal, David R. and Eyre, Dana P., “The U.S. Army in Peace Operations at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century,” U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 18 November 1994, pp 67-82.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Peace operations and operations in support of diplomatic efforts are not separate and distinct, but rather are operations that occur along a continuum of events that are time-phase driven, rather than level-of-conflict driven. Peacebuilding operations are a continuation of peacekeeping operations along the continuum of peace operations in general. The *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* definition of peacebuilding is inadequate because it concentrates on preventing a relapse into conflict instead of focusing on the goal of a sustained and lasting peace. Peacebuilding is the establishment of a secure environment that allows economic, political, humanitarian, and social development, the conditions necessary for a stable peace. Peacebuilding therefore requires a longer and more robust presence than most peace operations. The process of peacebuilding provides a transition from the consent of the former warring factions to the terms of an agreement or accord, to the institutionalization of the peace process. PBO are a necessary element of the peace operations continuum because they create conditions that allow the exit of US and other military forces without the re-emergence of violence.

Because the process of peacebuilding is event driven, military missions performed during peacebuilding operations will vary based upon the situation and the time period in which they occur. The desired end-state of PBO is a self-sustaining, lasting peace; consequently, PBO missions must include the task of creating a partnership with those local authorities and civilian agencies responsible for stability and achieving the desired end state.

It can be expected that some of the missions conducted in PKO will continue during PBO. Some PK tasks will not be needed because of changes in the situation; other PK tasks will be modified to fit the situation. Professional training of the entity armed forces will go a long way to promote the consolidation of democracy and the establishment of a self-sustaining, lasting peace. The combined education of the NCO and officer corps will help maintain the impartiality of SFOR and will assist in the establishment of local coalitions in support of the peacebuilding process

The most useful role and mission the military can provide to PBO is the coordination and communication of the objectives and operations of the different participants in the peacebuilding process. The military has a well-defined hierarchical structure and is able to respond on relatively short notice for a wide variety of missions and situations. Military leaders can draw on the considerable experience of the National Guard in MSCA to meet the special requirements of the stability mission. The military is well suited for and has vast experience in campaign planning, and has the capability and resources to perform coordination at the multi-organizational level. The redesign and retooling of the Civil Military Operations Center will help to create a partnership with authorities and civilian agencies, and provide synchronization, unity of effort, and unity of objective among participants. The CMOC can help to create a bridge between civilian implementation tasks and military implementation tasks by facilitating coordination and two-way communication among military and local leaders and groups.

JV 2020 says that service members will require a multitude of skills. In order better to prepare these personnel for peacebuilding operations, it is essential that they receive a solid foundation of knowledge, skills and training that prepare them to respond

to complex and politically highly sensitive environments. They must be able to think for themselves in situations where there is not a predefined desirable outcome. Soldiers and leaders also must be able to work in partnership with local authorities and civilian agencies to support the mission objectives.

Soldiers and leaders also must have the foundation of knowledge and skills that allows them to use situation assessment tools to determine the appropriate action for a given situation. Cultural awareness, the roles of IOs and NGOs, negotiation techniques and the use of interpreters all provide the leader with the inputs for METT-TC and OCOKA in a PBO environment. The possibility of multiple responses to the same training scenario will teach soldiers and leaders to draw on a variety of inputs for the METT-TC and OCOKA process, and will ensure that they know how to cope effectively with a range of possible situations.

Gaining the necessary store of skills and knowledge either during the “right seat ride” process or while “on the ground” no longer is effective because of reduced deployment cycles. By the time leaders are proficient in these skills they are rotating out. More and better training and education on these specialized PBO tasks is needed to give leaders and soldiers the knowledge and skills to succeed in complex and politically sensitive PBO missions.

The desired end-state of PBO is to achieve a self-sustaining, lasting peace. The following recommendations will help military leaders and planners to achieve that goal.

1. Soldiers and leaders need to be provided front-loaded education and training in the following areas:

- a. Political, cultural and historical factors influencing the stability mission. Topics should include major political parties, platforms and agendas; local municipal systems; the pre-war, current, and future economy; social and cultural differences and similarities among groups, formal and informal social structures, and religions; and history of the conflict and stability operations.
- b. Roles, responsibilities, and strategies of indigenous institutions, US government agencies and organizations, IOs and NGOs for executing the stability mission. Topics should include purpose and desired end-state of the operation; roles, agendas and structures of the UN, TCNs, and SFOR; roles, objectives, areas of operation, and methods of major IOs and NGOs; and entity armed forces organization and agendas.
- c. Negotiation, conflict resolution and communication skills needed to promote stability. Topics should include negotiation techniques and methods; and effective use of interpreters.
- d. Techniques in problem solving with influence and how to “think about the Area of Responsibility.” Topics should include interagency coordination problems and opportunities; using the media to advance stability; and legal issues and considerations.
- e. Lessons learned in previous attempts by military units, NGOs and IOs to promote stability. Topics should include current and past stability operations; TTPs from previous rotations; and lessons learned from previous rotations.

- f. This education and training should be conducted in a seminar format that will allow for interaction between soldiers and leaders and the subject matter expert.
 - g. Training and education should be level specific. Three basic levels of instruction should be developed: soldier (E-1 to E-4), Junior Leader (E-5 to E-8/ O-1 to O-3), and Senior Leader (E-8 & E-9/ O-4 to O-6). The level of instruction should be tailored to the audience in terms of detail, depth, and complexity.
- 2. Development and execution of STX, MRE, Staff Exercises, and Decision Making Exercises that operate along the full spectrum of possible responses within the theater.
 - a. This can be accomplished through the development of master events lists that vary the response of the OPFOR/ role players. During an iteration of the exercise or during one vignette, OPFOR/ role players respond in the worst-case scenario. At another time, the OPFOR/ role players respond with the best-case scenario. Most of the time, they respond with the most probable course of action based on the latest intelligence from the theater. Through the use of this type of challenging, unpredictable, and ambiguous training event, leaders and soldiers will gain increased flexibility and agility.
 - b. The 49th AD participated in eight Staff Training Exercises, one Advanced Decision Making Exercise, and the MRE. During the MRE for the 49th AD, there were 33 major events. This provides more than

ample opportunity to vary the response of the role players/ OPFOR to create an environment of unpredictability and ambiguity.

3. Development and execution of STX, MRE, Staff Exercises, and Decision Making Exercises that exercise operational knowledge and training at the appropriate level of decision-making consistent with performance of tasks within the theater.
 - a. To ensure that training at the appropriate level occurs, leaders must coordinate with personnel in theater. This will ensure that training operations are conducted at the same level as operations in theater.
 - b. Implementation of the MRE Project will help exercise the knowledge and training of all soldiers and leaders. The Institute for Creative Technologies at the University of Southern California is developing the MRE Project for the Army's Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command. The goal of the project is to create an experienced learning system in which participants are immersed in an environment where they can encounter the sights, sounds, and circumstances of real-world scenarios. Virtual humans act as characters and coaches in an interactive story with tutorial goals. Advancements such as the MRE Project will allow soldiers to gain practical experience using their education and training prior to deployment to the theater.

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